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Barthes's Body of Knowledge 
Abstract 
Roland Barthes invites a reading of his own texts in terms of the same methodologies he employs in his 
criticism. The «Biographeme»—those few details, preferences, inflections—which Barthes identified in his 
favorite authors, may be sought in Barthes as well. Barthes's biographeme, for me, consists of a glutinous 
effect associated with the organs of the mouth and throat as presented in several images, some of which 
belong to his tutor texts (Poe and Réquichot). An analysis of this biographeme reveals Barthes's strategy 
for disseminating the subject of knowledge—the author's fantasmatic body—through the signifiers of 
writing, fusing the heterogeneous singularities of the knower and the object of study. The metaphorical 
discourse that results opposes normal academic preoccupations in favor of knowledge of/as desire. 
Knowledge itself in Barthes becomes a second order signifier caught up in a catachretic process for 
naming the real. Barthes's procedure for exploring the real affectively, in terms of the body as it is defined 
in psychoanalysis, imposes on the reader a similar obligation to bring his or her own body into play in the 
learning experience. Barthes offers a model for a new genre of academic writing, combining science with 
autobiography, that has important implications for teaching and research in the humanities and social 
sciences. 
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BARTHES'S BODY OF KNOWLEDGE 
GREGORY L. ULMER 
University of Florida 
I want to interrogate Roland Barthes's writings with the same 
question he posed to his «objects» of study. In this way I hope to be 
able to enter into the new zone of knowledge which he 
designated-the singular. This zone includes everything that a 
«positivist» version of knowledge excludes. The most important ex- 
clusion of an «objective» science is the subject of the knower. Bar- 
thes's principal concern, in the last decade of his career, is with this 
«subject of knowledge»-the relation of the knower to what is 
known. 
I. The Biographeme. 
What interests me about Roland Barthes is why I am interested 
in him. What is Barthes, for me? This approach to Barthes's 
knowledge represents the way Barthes, following Nietzsche's lead, 
posed questions to himself. With this question I would like to deter- 
mine what there is to be learned from Barthes for me specifically, 
and, more generally, for a person in my situation (a teacher of the 
humanities). The «for me» serves to justify what is no doubt a par- 
tial reading of Barthes, yet what I am going to describe I will call 
the «essence» of Barthes. 
My point of departure for this reading is a passage from the 
preface to Sade, Fourier, Loyola, a preface which has itself already 
been marked as «essential.»' «Were I a writer, and dead, how I 
would love it if my life, through the pains of some friendly and 
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detached biographer, were to reduce itself to a few details, a few 
preferences, a few inflections, let us say: to `biographemes' whose 
distinction and mobility might go beyond any fate and come to 
touch, like Epicurean atoms, some future body, destined to the 
same dispersion.»2 The interest of such an approach to writing Bar- 
thes (about Barthes, and in the manner of Barthes) is the inevitably 
pluralistic results-the predicates that go with the subject «Bar- 
thes» will vary according to the lexicon of the reader. When Bar- 
thes himself applied the technique to some of his favorite texts, the 
biographemes that erupted through the conventional surface con- 
tent included «Sade's white muff, Fourier's flowerpots, Ignatius's 
Spanish eyes.» 
The biographemes of Barthes will consist of elements drawn 
from the images scattered through his critical writings, images 
which may or may not be related to the biographical Barthes. In at- 
tempting to identify at least one of these biographemes, I will be 
guided by a question posed by Barthes himself. When one has writ- 
ten a number of books, Barthes asks, «what does one repeat from 
one text to the next?» (Pretexte, 83). He notes that methods and 
critical procedures are not a source of continuity in a critic's 
writings, since they are dependent upon, and should arise out of, 
the particular problem being addressed. In the course of his own 
career, for example, Barthes worked through a number of tutor 
systems and authors-existentialism, marxism, psychoanalysis, 
semiotics-finally venturing to write «without support.» Late in his 
career, that is, Barthes attempted to explore what was his own, 
what repeated in his writings regardless of the system employed or 
the object of study. 
The search for Barthes's biographeme begins by looking away 
from Barthes's texts, the way «Barthes» turned his glance away 
from the pages of The Sorrows of Young Werther in Fragments of 
a Lover's Discourse, and from the photographs spread out before 
him in La Chambre claire. This procedure is necessary because the 
biographeme is the product not of analysis or examination, but of 
memory. 
I call anamnesis the action-a mixture of pleasure and ef- 
fort-performed by the subject in order to recover, without 
magnifying or sentimentalizing it, a tenuity of memory: it is 
the haiku itself. The biographeme (Sade, Fourier, Loyola) is 
nothing but a factitious anamnesis: the one I lend to the other 2





To answer the question-what is Barthes for me?-I have only 
to consider those elements which survive in my memory, before I 
consult his texts. What I find in my memory is a kind of collage 
composed of the following pieces: 1) the evocation of the grain of 
the voice in terms of an animal (or a human) muzzle-the fleshy, 
carnal timbre of a vocal writing described at the end of The 
Pleasure of the Text; 2) the «voice of death» scene analyzed by Bar- 
thes in his study of Poe's «The Case of M. Valdemar,» the voice 
being again muscular, viscous, issuing from the body-corpse; 3) the 
collages by Bernard Requichot composed from photographs of 
animals, depicting especially muzzles, tongues, in conglomerations 
that give a glutinous effect. The biographeme that «arises» out of 
these sources is an image of an erectile tongue, a tubular esophagus 
and clacking larynx-in short, the bodily apparatus of speech. The 
image concerns not the sound of speech, not the phonetic nor 
phonemic levels, but a throat and tongue at work. 
II. Theoretical Art. 
What is there to be learned from this biographeme? There are 
several points with respect to the image that call for comment. The 
first concerns the fact that Barthes uses images in his critical 
writing. The second has to do with the fact that two of the sources 
for the biographeme are not from Barthes directly but from his ob- 
ject of study-Poe and Requichot. Finally, I will inquire into the 
specific content of the image itself. 
1) Although the biographeme isolates certain «trivial» details, 
the presence of images in Barthes's writing can hardly be con- 
sidered trivial. His deliberate use of imagery, ranging from the 
turnstile in Mythologies to the (withheld) photograph of his mother 
in La Chambre claire, is one of the most striking features of Bar- 
thes's criticism. That Barthes considers his practice to be a dif- 
ferent, even new, kind of criticism may be seen in the explanation 
which he felt it necessary to provide as recently as the colloquium 
devoted to his work held at Cerisy-la-Salle (June, 1977). «The ma- 
jor trait of the new intellectual discourse,» he states, «is that it 3
Ulmer: Barthes's Body of Knowledge
Published by New Prairie Press
222 STCL, Vol. 5, No. 2 (Spring, 1981) 
assumes metaphor,» specifically, the metaphor called 
catachresis-a manner of speech that produces the effect of 
metaphor (a common example is «the arm of a chair») although 
behind the image there is no word in the language with which to 
denote the referent of the figure. (Pretexte, 438-39). Modern in- 
tellectual or critical discourse, then, is a kind of poetry, Barthes 
says, combining images and a denotative void. The new aspect is 
not the techniques-poets have long exploited imagery, word-play 
and so forth-but that the techniques of poetry are now appearing 
in meta-language, in the critical discourse itself. Barthes uses the 
term «text» to identify this metaphorical approach to commentary, 
as opposed to «science» which uses definition.' 
2) It may not be surprising to find that the biographeme of a 
critic should involve citational elements. What is noteworthy is the 
special relationship Barthes brings into being between the knower 
and the thing known. Opposed to the traditional academic or 
university discourse which applies the laws of mastery through 
analysis to the signified of the work studied, Barthes advocates a 
writing which caresses its subject matter, which interweaves or 
braids together several (heterogeneous) texts into a patchwork, thus 
composing a «writing of readings» (Pretexte, 152). The critic in this 
mode never becomes an «author,» but remains true to his function 
as a reader even when he writes. 
Barthes often complains that French lacks a modality of ut- 
terance that could mark this caress, a modality which is neither 
assertion nor doubt, and which could be pronounced or received 
«lightly.» Much of his writing is a struggle to supply this lack by in- 
venting a new discourse that allows the critic to come into the 
vicinity of knowledge in a relationship that is neither ignorance nor 
domination. Hubert Damisch suggests that Barthes's «light» 
writing could be classified as logokleptic (Pretexte, 394), a 
classification Barthes could accept since he acknowledges being a 
«thief of language.» The practice Barthes exemplifies, Damisch 
says, is that of the writer who «catches» language from another text 
(the way something catches fire, ignites). As Barthes himself 
describes it, his approach to other texts is esthetic rather than 
critical. His «constant procedure» is to use a «metaphorical 
linguistics: not that grammatical concepts seek out images in order 
to express themselves, but just the contrary, because these concepts 
come to constitute allegories, a second language, whose abstraction 
is diverted to fictive ends» (Barthes, 124). 4




Any commentator's speech is animated by what he chooses to 
write about. The difference here is that Barthes invests the object 
with sense, rather than deriving sense from the object; he becomes 
«active,» using the language or concepts of science to carry his 
desire. One of the consequences of his «allegorical» mode of ex- 
pression is that he frequently writes prefaces for the works of other 
authors or artists. The topics he chooses to write about-Erte's (the 
fashion designer) alphabet made up of women posed as letters, the 
cookbook by Brillat-Savarin, Arcimboldo's portraits-are in a 
sense (or function as) intellectual readymades. To take one exam- 
ple, Barthes describes the allegorical method of Arcimboldo as an 
embodiment of the very process by which language builds meaning 
through connotation. An Arcimboldo portrait will be composed of 
various fruits, flowers, vegetables or animals, to produce the 
signified «head.» But beyond this figurative sense lies a third mean- 
ing, an allegory of Summer, or Flora, or Water, and so forth. To 
this point only the normal phenomenon of connotation is involved. 
However, «connotation opens a process of meaning; beginning 
from the allegorical sense, other meanings are possible, not only 
`cultural,' these, but arising from movements (attraction or repul- 
sion) of the body. Beyond perception and signification (itself lex- 
ical or cultural), develops a whole world of value.»s Inevitably, the 
value he mentions is that which repeats in the evaluator; for what 
Barthes finds in Arcimboldo, or rather, what he invests in Arcim- 
boldo, is his own biographeme: «Arcimboldo's heads are 
monstrous because they return everything, whatever the charm of 
the allegorical subject (Summer, Spring, Flora, Water) to a malaise 
of substance: a swarming...a whole larval life, the embroilment of 
vegetative beings, worms, foetuses, viscera, which are at the limit 
of life, not yet born, and nevertheless already liable to putrefac- 
tion» (Arcimboldo, 64-65). 
The critical metaphor may have no denoted sense, but it does 
produce a global meaning which Barthes calls the signifiance of the 
subject who speaks, «his affect, his deep pathos» (Pretexte, 439). 
In other words, Barthes's writing implicates himself as the subject 
of knowledge, or, to put it another way, Barthes's alternative to the 
ponderousness of normal academic writing is to interrogate his own 
pleasure.' The metaphorical discourse that results is one that not 
only recognizes, but takes pleasure in, the metaphorical nature of 
language, rather than trying to reduce it to the «propriety» of a 
science. This «impropriety» is necessary in any case because Bar- 5
Ulmer: Barthes's Body of Knowledge
Published by New Prairie Press
224 STCL, Vol. 5, No. 2 (Spring, 1981) 
thes addresses a level of reality that exists at the limits of knowledge 
excluded from the extant codes of both opinion and science. This is 
the level of the «third meaning»-the obtuse, the oblique, the 
novelesque, the filmic, the biographeme. He explicitly identifies 
this zone of knowledge as the existentially unique, the absolutely 
particular event, which Lacan calls the Real.' 
As Barthes noted with regard to the catachretic metaphor, the 
Real is not describable. But it is «theoretically locatable.» 8 Much of 
Barthes's work in the last decade of his life consisted of the 
development of a methodology-a procedure or operation-that 
would provide access to the «third meaning.» The nature of his 
procedure is stated in the Fragments of a Lover's Discourse. In that 
book, which explores the ancient relationship between loving and 
knowing, the lover confronts the mystic experience of knowing that 
(but also what) one does not know-the other: «instead of trying to 
define the other ('what is he?'), I turn to myself: 'What do I want, 
wanting to know you?»" The unknown becomes accessible through 
the language of pleasure, of attraction and repulsion (especially 
repulsion, considering his biographeme). 
A major development in this turn to the subject (of 
knowledge) is the notion of the punctum in La Chambre claire. 
Barthes sets out to identify the «ontology» or the essence of 
photography (remember his taste for doing the unfashionable, or 
unexpected) by interrogating his own responses to certain 
photographs. When a photo «stings» him, when he «tilts,» is mark- 
ed by a wound or lesion, he knows he is in the presence of the Real. 
By whatever name Barthes identifies this notion, it represents 
an alternative to the conception of knowledge that underlies nor- 
mal academic writing. Indeed, in many respects Barthes's relation- 
ship to knowledge is the most innovative, liberating aspect of his 
criticism. The «third way» he develops to get at the «third mean- 
ing» provides an alternative to the choice dividing knowledge into 
science and art, a hybrid that could be described as «theoretical 
art.» The primary quality of his approach is its renunciation of the 
notion of knowledge as a mastery over the object known («truth»), 
preferring instead to simulate the mode of knowledge contained in 
literature. Barthes continually is in the process of theorizing this 
alternative relation to knowledge, with one of the best examples be- 
ing his inaugural address delivered upon his appointment to the 
College de France. What he describes in the address as the three 
forces of literature (the kind of knowledge accomodated in 6




literature broadly defined as the practice of writing)-Mathesis, 
Mimesis, Semiosis-he puts into practice in his own essays. All 
three of the forces could be summed up by his phrase, «writing 
makes knowledge festive.» His is a knowledge that «does not say it 
knows something, but that it knows of something» (Mathesis); 
writing (text) contains the utopian desire to represent the impossi- 
ble real, using therefore dramatic rather than epistemological 
means (Mimesis); and, rather than interpret, writing plays with 
signs, to elude the dogmatisms of truth (Semiosis) (October, 7). In 
short, the principal lesson of Barthes's writing may be summarized 
as the radical introduction of pleasure into the academic discourse. 
3) What about the content of the biographeme? Why that par- 
ticular image? The question has two parts-why that image for 
Barthes? and why for me? The answer with respect to Barthes is, at 
one level at least, simple enough, since the image represents what 
Barthes declared to be the «mana-word» of his entire corpus-the 
body (Barthes, 130). The obsessive image of the body which recurs 
throughout Barthes's texts (signifying the level of «self» which con- 
cerns him), may be localized quite specifically in the vocal ap- 
paratus that makes speech possible. Once noticed, the biographeme 
turns up everywhere. That is, it frequently provides the descriptive 
terms for whatever Barthes is discussing. The use of the voice in 
Bunraku, to give just one example of this thematic, is elaborated 
openly, Barthes says, «at the level of the internal body, visceral, for 
which the larynx is the mediating muscle.»'® 
During the early stages of his exploration of pleasure, Barthes 
found the cinema to be the best manifestation of this «grain of the 
voice» in the contemporary world, particularly the close-up techni- 
que (face and throat) which he cited as an image of what he meant 
by «writing aloud.» Barthes's book on photography, then, is a 
natural extension of his fascination with the body image. The 
camera, especially the click of the shutter, had functioned previous- 
ly for him as an image of the event of meaning (or articulation). 
The meaning-the zone of knowledge-that interests Barthes is in 
the neighborhood of haiku, a sheer designation that he compares to 
«a photograph which one takes very carefully (a la japonaise), but 
while having omitted to put film in the camera» (Empire, 113). He 
noted previously, also, that to grasp the filmic (the obtuse aspect of 
film) required the study of «stills» (Image, 66). Photography is 
superior to the cinema «still» because of the way in which the pose 
struck by the person photographed doubles the way the 7
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photographic instant immobilizes the person or object for the eye 
(Chambre, 122). The posed attitude of the body is a central part of 
Barthes's image which accounts for his interest in the alphabet of 
women posed as letters drawn by Erte. A pose is found also in the 
special definition of «figure» used as an organizing device in the 
Fragments. The term is to be understood not in its rhetorical sense, 
but as «the body's gesture caught in action...what in the straining 
body can be immobilized» (Fragments, 4). 
As I mentioned earlier, the referent for these images cannot be 
denoted, but it can be located theoretically, which is to say «fictive- 
ly.» The discourse that gives access to the erotic body (as distinct 
from the physical body) is psychoanalysis. The body, Barthes 
notes, is the place in which the unconscious is founded." The reali- 
ty Barthes explores using the unconscious as an instrument of 
criticism is, as Freud theorized it, a dual phenomenon, containing 
both life and death drives, both desire and mourning. The body is a 
place of pain, suffering, and death, as well as of pleasure (a point 
anyone who considers following Barthes's model must keep in 
mind). If Barthes's earlier projects tended to favor the life princi- 
ple, his more recent work deals with the death drive. His «hedonist 
project» of dealing only with his desire, he says, is too reduced to 
recognize the universal (essential) nature of photography. «I 
understood that it was necessary from now on to interrogate the 
evidence of photography not from the point of view of pleasure, 
but in relation to what one romantically calls love and death» 
(Chambre, 115). The results of this research carry him away from 
written texts through the photographic image to the referent, the 
real itself. The photograph, which Barthes insists functions as an 
analogon, makes possible a «science of the unsayable,» a new 
realism from which writing is barred by its fundamentally fictional 
nature (Chambre, 134). In the book on love Barthes explained the 
problem of writing, a feeling of futility because writing «is precisely 
there where you are not.» The word «suffering» expresses no suf- 
fering, after all, and therefore compensates for nothing, sublimates 
nothing (Fragments, 98-100). But the photograph carries one to the 
very root of reality. Hence Barthes shifts his tutor text from the 
literary to the photographic image. 8




III. The Sting. 
Now I come to the more difficult question-the for me. What 
is Barthes, and his biographeme, for me? Of course, it is a question 
only if I choose to take Barthes seriously not only as an object of 
study, but as a model for my own practice (or, as some would have 
it, if I allow myself to be taken in by Barthes, reading «sting» as a 
ruse). I will in fact attempt only the barest beginning of an answer 
to the question, while keeping in mind the lightness, the non- 
assertive quality of Barthes's model (what I have to say should be 
received in the spirit of that lightness). 
First I should clarify what I think Barthes's practice entails for 
the critic. There is, to begin with, the turn to the real (with a small 
or,» because something other than Lacan's theory is at stake), 
which repeats at another level Barthes's original turn to «himself.» 
His turn has two implications for me. One is that Barthes's example 
is there to be built upon, that it is probably not possible to continue 
working as an ecrivant (treating language as a transparent medium 
to be manipulated for the efficient reporting of research results) 
given the way Barthes (not to mention a number of other contem- 
porary theorists) has undermined the epistemological foundations 
of traditional critical writing. Barthes mapped out the passage from 
ecrivant to ecrivain, from scholar to writer, which should make it 
easier for those academics who wish to «write» (to be theoretical 
artists). He labored his entire career (or played) to free himself 
from his dependency on the intellectual systems of others and to 
speak in his own voice (which he discovered to be the voice of the 
body epitomized by the act of swallowing). To some extent, then, 
others can begin where he left off-to transform, for better or 
worse, his experiment into a «normal science.» 
At the same time (the second implication), the «origin» of Bar- 
thes's discovery must be re-experienced, reactivated by each practi- 
tioner. The procedure resists any mechanical, external transmission 
which «forgets» the initiating insight. Thus, to become a writer is a 
process, involves a development. One does not begin at the depth 
Barthes reached in La Chambre claire (although one could simulate 
the language used easily enough), which is why I cannot in this 
paper deal with why I chose to write about Barthes's biographeme 
rather than something else. The point of these two implications 
taken together is that other critics need not wait to «earn» the right 9
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to practice the mode of critical pleasure by first doing some 
«heavy» scholarship. One may begin immediately to «write,» 
realizing that the requirements of this mode are as rigorous in their 
own way as those of scholarship. (The fact that I need to say this at 
all shows how much of a normal critic I am). 
Let me consider, then, the lesson of Barthes's turn to himself, 
which I define as his entry into the real. The lesson is that when I 
ask what Barthes is for me, I am opening the question Barthes pos- 
ed to himself-the desire to know how and why a body adhered to a 
particular idea (Pretexte, 301). The question «why Barthes?» opens 
onto the question of all my choices and interests, onto the realiza- 
tion that all my choices are «interested,» are «investments» and 
embody projections. If I agree to assume the question I have 
already begun the experiment Barthes himself undertook. In any 
case, the question of the subject of knowledge can only be explored 
meaningfully from my own position. Nor is the answer predeter- 
mined, for the question of the subject of knowledge is the question 
that leads to a «science» of the singular, just the opposite of the 
monotheism of positivist truth that I absorbed by osmosis 
throughout my schooling. When I say that the answer is not 
predetermined I am referring to the feeling I have as I entertain this 
(entertaining) question that it is a real question-I do not already 
know the answer, not even in the sense of having the rhetorical 
template with which to fabricate a response. The effect, in short, is 
of a self-consciousness in which I begin to take note of that which 
repeats in me, rather than in some «object of study»; my interest 
shifts from other writers' patterns to my own. The first step in this 
shift is to identify some of the qualities of this pattern, and then to 
take account of the punctum related to academic reading-I will in- 
terrogate the central genre of my professional life (academic 
writing) by identifying a few of those works which are events for 
me, which sting me into an awareness of reality. I should emphasize 
that at this stage of my development as writer I am curious about 
the nature of my intellect. I have nothing to say about love and 
death. 
1) The pattern generated by my writing will not take very long 
to deal with, given the limited amount of material there is to work 
with. Nonetheless, enough has been published so that when I list 
the «figures» upon whose works I have written there forms a 
definite group of shared characteristics, to the point that one could 
predict the kind of artists I will most likely choose to work on in the 10




future. My list of (principal) tutor authors consists of Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau, D. H. Lawrence, Miguel de Unamuno, and Roland Bar- 
thes. The first thing that comes to mind about this group (at least to 
my mind) is that they are all explicitly «confessional» or at least 
autobiographical writers. The very fact that I am discussing myself 
in this article is a symptom of my sympathy for this quality. 
Another quality shared by the group is «interdisciplinariness.» 
Each one writes in more than one genre, and cuts across the 
science-art opposition. In fact, they may all be categorized as 
«theoretical artists»-they explore the realm of knowledge using 
the instruments of art, a practice which is inherently anti-specialist. 
«A writer,» Barthes states, «must have the persistence of the 
watcher who stands at the crossroads of all other discourses, in a 
position that is trivial in relation to purity of doctrine» (October, 
9). The recognition of this autobiographical, interdisciplinary pat- 
tern raises my practice from contingency to necessity and enables 
(requires) me to begin practicing what I preach (A Rousseauistic 
compulsion)-to begin doing what I insist on talking about (I can- 
not keep insisting that the observer is part of his observation 
without becoming responsible for my own presence in my writing). 
Barthes early on marked his desire for authenticity in criticism by 
declaring that the only valid critical position is one that openly 
acknowledges its ideological interests (in Critique et verite); later in 
the same vein he noted that the only way to «comment» on a text is 
to produce another text. 
2) To guide his search for the essence of photography, Barthes 
used a procedure involving the punctum. As I noted earlier, the 
punctum is the sting experienced in the presence of certain 
photographs, a response of the body to certain details in the pic- 
tures, and to a certain experience of time. The effect, Barthes says, 
often is not felt until later-it remains latent, emerging as an after- 
effect (the quality of being «unforgettable»). In adapting the punc- 
tum to help me get the bearings of my intellectual development, 
then, I will rely upon the same operation of anamnesis associated 
with the biographeme. The essence I would like to isolate by means 
of this memory technique pertains to a genre loosely identifiable as 
academic writing. Keeping in mind that Barthes drew the essence of 
photography out of a photograph of his mother (and not from a 
professional or «art» photograph), I will not apologize for the 
«unrepresentative» nature of the materials that insist in my 
thoughts. In any case, the four writers I will mention are all 11
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teachers, even academics (with one exception). And, just as Barthes 
described it, I find that the punctum functions by means of the 
detail. Here, then, are the four «points.» 
a) An elephant figurine. According to Book 1 of the published 
proceedings of Jacques Lacan's seminars, figurines in the shape of 
elephants were distributed at the conclusion of the final meeting of 
the group. The figurines serve as a memory vehicle for the theory of 
language described by Lacan during the seminars. The actions of 
distributing the figurines summarizes the principal lesson Lacan 
has for me as a teacher-the need for a more «concrete» presenta- 
tion of materials in the humanities disciplines. Lacan's use of 
models from a variety of fields in his discussion of the psyche is an 
extremely suggestive device. It may be, as Sherry Turk le reported in 
Psychoanalytic Politics, that when Lacan lectured at M.I.T. using 
blackboard drawings of knots no one understood what he was driv- 
ing at. And yet, at one level at least, the lesson is clear enough. A 
metaphor is often described as a knot in language, and, as is well 
known, Lacan professes that the unconscious is structured like a 
language, therefore functioning according to the principles of 
metaphor, metonomy, and so forth. The knots are a metaphor of 
metaphor to which Lacan must have recourse since, like Barthes, 
he rejects the possibility of a meta-language. The humanities, for 
all of the ways they have imitated the sciences, have failed to learn 
perhaps the most valuable lesson science teaching has for us-to 
provide in the class room concrete demonstrations and models of 
what is being abstractly, intellectually, verbally treated. We seem to 
imagine that our object of study is its own model. But, as Borges 
pointed out, a map that is on the same scale as the country it depicts 
is useless. 
b) Patience. Also from a set of lectures published in book 
form, this detail I encountered in Heidegger's What is called think- 
ing? I was impressed by the patience with which Heidegger ap- 
proached his topic-truly an example of «lightness» or of a caress- 
ing of the idea. I recall not the passage from Nietzsche which is the 
object of study, but the statement that the most thought provoking 
thing is that we are still not thinking. Instead, we are on our way (at 
least when we are with Heidegger) toward thinking, a journey that 
the lectures simulate. His gradual, luxurious circling of the problem 
being posed releases me from the expectation that the starting point 
of «thought» (research) is to be already thinking, that is, to already 
«know,» and from the notion that the nature of thinking is to hurry 12




directly, by the shortest linear (logical) route, to results (truth, utili- 
ty). Heidegger achieves a poetic or aesthetic relationship with ideas. 
He gives me a taste of a delicious alternative to information, a 
savouring of a problem. The way he keeps putting off answering 
the question he has posed exemplifies the digressive technique 
which Barthes identifies as the technique of subversive teaching. 
The measure of the truth of Barthes's view is the degree to which 
the digressive approach violates my students' expectations and 
assumptions, prompting them to write (whenever I try this techni- 
que) on the course evaluation: «hard to take notes from.» 
c) A logic textbook. Walter Ong's Ramus, Method and the 
Decay of Dialogue, traces the historical context for the appearance 
in the sixteenth century of Peter Ramus's extraordinarily influen- 
tial textbook on logic. Ong shows that Ramism emerged out of the 
necessity in the circumstances of scholastic education to teach the 
principles of logic to very young pupils, so young that it was not 
uncommon to have a Master of Arts degree by the age of fifteen. 
Because the pupils in the Arts course were unprepared for the 
epistemological and metaphysical complexities of the methods and 
problems of Scholasticism proper, a textbook was developed for 
them which taught a quantified logic drastically simplified and 
systematized. The unintended consequence was that the «short- 
cuts» were so persuasive that the primer ultimately replaced 
Scholasticism itself and contributed to the development of modern 
scientific thinking. In other words, the notion of knowledge that 
played a major role in the paradigm shift during the Renaissance 
was shaped by the pedagogical circumstances of the period. 
Knowledge is based on what it seems expedient or convenient to 
teach rather than on some abstract correspondence with «truth.» 
The merger, or rather the priority of pedagogy over philosphy 
noted in Ong's account provides a subversive lesson about the 
material (situated) character of knowledge and truth, a lesson that 
has been taken up in our own time by the French «groupe de 
recherches sur l'enseignement philosophique» (GREPH). Ong's 
book provides an historical verification of the contemporary 
theories of «writing» which stress that no medium (whether a 
university course, scientific text, television report) is transparent. 
Every detail of the real, practical conditions in which we teach con- 
stitutes knowledge, although, until recently, I tended to consider 
the institutional circumstances of the teaching situation to be 
obstacles to real knowledge. The attempt to escape the idealist- 13
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materialist opposition-the traditional scene of the debate about 
knowledge-is represented in Barthes's pedagogy, a topic which I 
will treat at another time. 
d) A prison library. Malcolm X, whose formal schooling end- 
ed after the eighth grade, became an autodidact while in prison, an 
experience which transformed him from a petty criminal to a 
political activist. He explains in his autobiography that he 
discovered the «monstrosity» of black slavery-the full history of 
this terrible institution-preserved in all its detail in the scholarship 
written by white intellectuals. The «betrayal of the intellectuals» 
has nothing to do with their competence or their devotion to truth, 
but with their indifference to the «fate» of their knowledge. Their 
betrayal is in their failure to make available-to popularize-the 
fruits of their research. The major challenge he poses to the 
academic profession is to find some way to introduce (unpopular) 
«real knowledge» directly into the popular media. His point finds 
theoretical support in the work of Jtirgen Habermas who stresses 
the importance of the exchange of real knowledge through the mass 
media for the survival of democratic society. Bertolt Brecht's 
ideas-especially his interest in fusing entertainment and learn- 
ing-have been the point of departure for recent attempts to meet 
this challenge in the film medium. 
IV. For a New Academic Writing. 
As Barthes defined it, the punctum is a supplement, existing in 
what I add to the object, the thoughts that arise in association with 
the object. To be consistent with Barthes's model, I must now go 
on to draw from these four anamneses a conclusion, however pro- 
visional, about the essence of academic writing. I intended by 
means of the after-effect of the punctum to construct an 
«academeme» of the academic text-writing done by scholars, 
critics, profesors. The four details meet the criterion of the punc- 
tum-the effect of a sting that leaves a mark in the memory-for, 
of all the «professional» reading I have done, these four works, 
and the ideas associated with them, have somehow stayed with me. 
Surprisingly, all four details, it turns out, are related to a certain 
theory of teaching, rather than to what might be described as nor- 14




mal academic research. The evidence of the punctum (by virtue of 
its sheer reality for me) requires me to conclude that the teaching 
performance is closer to the noema of academic writing than is the 
genre of «pure» research (which, in the language and literature 
disciplines usually means a formalist or historical reading of a work 
of literature in the fine arts sense of the term). My conclusion, in- 
verting the teacher-scholar hierarchy of our profession, echoes, in a 
sense, Barthes's conclusion that the amateur photographer is closer 
to the noema of photography than is the professional. 
It seems likely that a full realization that the essence of 
academic writing is the teaching performance could open the way 
to the development of an alternative means of conducting academic 
research and communicating the results of this research, an alter- 
native that might substantially alter the concept of academic 
speculation. And yet the growth of knowledge in the academic 
disciplines in several key instances-the example of Saussure comes 
to mind-has been stimulated by the description of non-existent 
sciences, a fact that encourages me to proceed. Such speculation, in 
any case, fits nicely within the genre of theoretical art. 
At present the humanities disciplines are in a state of transition 
that is leading them, however gradually, to a complete redefinition, 
a reapportionment of boundaries. That the question of boundaries 
is the crucial question is evidenced by the fact that the most con- 
troversial philosopher today-Jacques Derrida-is working out a 
theory of boundaries, borderings, margins, including a theory of 
translation that concerns the crossing of borders. The consequences 
of the theories of deconstruction, «ecriture,» semiotics, and so 
forth for academic work are clear, at least in general terms-the 
dissolution of the boundaries separating the officially recognized 
educational institution from the culture as a whole: from the mass 
media and the entertainment industry. In epistemic terms this 
means that the educational institution is entering the television age. 
The major adjustment to be made, and made first of all at the level 
of epistemology, concerns the shift from the book to television as 
the principal educational medium. It seems likely that the way 
Sesame Street and The Electric Company teach reading will have 
the same effect on traditional academic knowledge that Ramus's 
logic text had on Scholasticism. The current mode of most 
academic teaching exists within the paradigm of the printed 
book-the mass produced but static, linear book dominates and 
determines the teaching performance. The availability of printed 15
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books, when they first appeared, drastically altered the Medieval 
teaching technique, which consisted of dictating from a 
manuscript. And television will just as drastically alter what cur- 
rently passes for teaching in the normal classroom. 
Under the television episteme, the present hierarchy governing 
printed article-teaching performance will be inverted. The low pro- 
fessional status of the teaching performance, at least under the pre- 
sent system of values, is due largely to the «unpublishability» of 
teaching. But television obviously changes the situation with the 
technology of video tapes. The future of academic writings depends 
on learning to articulate words with images, verbal with visual 
knowledge. Roland Barthes, with his metaphorical approach to 
criticism, holds many clues to what this new academic writing could 
be like. 
Finally, the precritical nature of the points I have presented is 
all too apparent. I have scarcely engaged the level of pleasure, let 
alone the levels of love and death. I have not attempted to analyze 
motives-the desire that guides my choices. Barthes turns to 
psychoanalysis in order to theorize the desire that underlies intellec- 
tual drive. In psychoanalysis, the original theoretical question, the 
fate of which determines all later questions an individual asks, may 
be paraphrased as, «Where do I come from?» or, literally, «How 
are babies made?)»-the question of human sexuality. This ques- 
tion, for me, is an allegory of the problem of origins that exists at 
every level of knowledge. I am not prepared at this point to follow 
Barthes into psychoanalysis, but I am inclined to ask the question 
at the social level because I wonder where I come from, intellectual- 
ly speaking. How did I (how does one) become a «scriptor,» a 
«writer,» an «intellectual» in America? If enough American 
academics begin to take such a question seriously, that is, to pose it 
as a part of their professional work, an academic revolution will be 
underway. 
The traditional analytical or descriptive article each of us is 
trained to produce can still be written, although the struggles to 
adapt this form to the new theories (structuralist and post- 
structuralist) seem to me to resemble the efforts of Ptolemaens to 
appropriate Copernicans. The special logical status of 
autobiography (special because truth and the real meet in the in- 
dividual's lived world) makes it the natural genre for the period of 
transition in which we already find ourselves. Barthes waited until 
the latter part of his career to give us his «autobiography» (or at 16




least a critical and theoretical extension of that genre). But the 
lesson of his career, in the light of our contemporary concern with 
the problematic nature of the subject of knowledge, is that the 
oautobiography»-in a form still being worked out-is one of the 
first books an academic worker should write, not the last. 
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